CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED

 

Consciousness explained

1. Introduction.

The aim of this paper is the original description of a hypothetical neural mechanism able to explain the formation of the percept and therefore consciousness.

Consciousness, or the conscious self, might be defined as perception with uniqueness and individuality (indivisibility).

Perception might be defined as the knowledge of reality based on the sensory information. The perception is the interpretation of the sensory information, the identification of an object through the formation of the percept, the mental object of perception.

The brain forms the percept rebuilding an objective mental image of anything by means of integrating (summing) diverse sensory information. For instance: when perceiving a red snooker ball, the brain associates and integrates information about (at least, for instance) the round form and the red colour of the ball, whose information is being simultaneously processed along parallel neural ways. The mental image of the red ball as a whole, when the perception process reaches its goal, constitutes a fusion of the information pertaining form and colour in a sole emergent mental object, the “red ball” percept, unique and indivisible (like consciousness), because form and colour are by then inseparable inside the percept. Form and colour won’t be perceived as two objects during the perception of a red ball: one object being a round form without any colour and a second object being a red colour without a round form. Furthermore, neither will the red ball be perceived as one sole object in the form of a colourless round form nor as one sole object in the form of a formless red colour. Form and colour will be effective, both, and at the same time, although entangled, with uniqueness and individuality of the resulting whole, the “red ball” percept.

As the “red ball” percept has parts, form and colour (at least), but they are inseparable at first sight in the conscious mind once the percept is formed, in spite of the parts being coded in different neural sets (there have to be, for instance, at least two different specific neural networks in different spatial locations inside the brain, to begin with, for the coding of form and colour on each specific set of neurons), that inability to differentiate the parts as separate percepts must be based upon a loss of the capacity for the temporal resolution at first sight to differentiate form and colour as two mental objects instead of one, a sole red ball. That seeming fusion of form and colour in the form of an objective unique red ball in the mind, as a “red ball” percept, complete as a whole, has to be an illusion due to a lack or temporal resolution. There’s some evidence supporting the reasonability of this manner of describing the percept. For instance: It’s been published that the so called “quantum of consciousness” is the minimum time below which it wouldn’t be possible, for a person, to differentiate between two auditive stimuli as a function of time. It has been estimated that 12.5 miliseconds is the minimum time that’s necessary to be able to differentiate between two sound stimuli (Kristofferson, 1984). If the time difference is less than 12.5 ms they will be perceived as one auditive percept only, one indivisible sound, one beep, although two beeps could be isolated separately on a lesser time scale for those stimuli.

That unknown neural mechanism behind this entanglement of mental objects to give rise to a unique and indivisible percept through a loss of the capacity for the temporal resolution of the different mental objects that form a percept is known as the binding problem.

If you cover one eye, you’ll be able to perceive a whole image of a red ball with the other eye. If you use both eyes at the same time you’ll still be perceiving one sole image of everything instead of two, for instance, one red ball instead of two red balls (unless you misalign both eyes, for instance, by pushing one eyeball with the tip of your finger). In the time of Sherrington it was considered that this binding could not be the result of a cancellation of the image from one of the eyes, because the reconstituted image from both eyes at once is stereoscopic, while the image from a single eye (covering the other one) is not. This fact drove them to conclude that this unique image from both eyes at once should be the result of a fusion of two simultaneous images, one from each eye, by means of an integration of the neural activity of the correlative networks involved. The resulting whole would also happen to be be bigger (stereoscopic in this case) than the sum of its parts.

The brain is formed by neurons. Neurons are cells. Their activity consists of producing and conducting action potentials along them and transmitting those action potentials across the gap between them. An action potential is a transient electric discharge. The transmission between neurons takes place through the synapse, the place where the neurons connect with each other through a gap, without direct contact. That transmission takes place by the secretion of neurotransmitters in the synapse from the discharging neuron towards the second neuron connected with the first one. The second neuron will discharge too in response to the stimulus of the neurotransmitter (phasic response) or will change the rate of discharge if it was already discharging and conducting its own action potential (neuromodulling). This all happens in a matter of thousands of a second (miliseconds). A neuron can discharge dozens of action potentials per second, able to be transmitted to other neurons, forming concrete and specific sequences or trains of discharge, with a characteristic pattern for each particular synapse or group of synapses. Each neuron keeps thousands of sypapses with other neurons. There are some fourteen billion neurons in the brain cortex. Neurons build microscopic circuits, the circuits build macroscopic neural networks and these make up supernetworks.

The transmission of information inside the brain is organized in algorithms, following patterns. For instance: The transmission is produced in one way in each synapse, forward only, not backwards, which generates order, in spite of the brain being a chaotic system. It’s also a source of order among the brain’s fundamental chaos that each neuron is not connected with all the other neurons but only with some of them, and in a stable fashion, and so a huge but limited number of concrete circuits and patterns of information are generated, not just everything possible.

The patterns of discharge of trains of action potentials, transmitted between neurons in the synapses, are heterogeneous, due to the entrance of information in the brain through diverse sensory cells. For instance: the auditory cells in the internal ear discharge towards the brain neural circuits differently compared to the visual cells in the retin of the eye. The diverse sensory cells are neurons modified in different fashion along the evolution of the species and have become specific to each type of stimulus.

A symbol is an organized shape or form able to be used to establish a code. A code is a set of symbols able to emit a message. The patterns of discharge of the trains of action potentials have concrete forms so they mean a coding of the mental information. The transmitter and receptor of said message, inside the brain, is each neuron connected to the next, transmitting those patterns between them through the synapses. Computation is the treatment of symbols and computing is thinking. The aim of computation is the solution of problems and that’s what the nervous system is good for, thanks to its capacity of foreseeing (computing scenarios) and executing.

The mental information coded and transmitted through the synapses possesses abstract character, meaning representative. For instance: The mental object formed by the word “Sun” is not the object Sun in the sky itself but a mental representation of it. The mind is the abstract information computed by the brain. The mental information is abstract and also isomorphic, congruent and mnesic (as explained somewhere else in this blog).

2. A possible solution to the binding problem.

As the two images of both eyes are perceived as one, and stereoscopic, Sherrington inferred that the binding mechanism would include the temporal concurrence of the correlative neural activity, a neuronal synchronization. Nevertheless, a mere synchronization of the frequencies, a mere coincidence of the action potentials of the correlative neurons by the spikes of their discharges, would not be able to explain the formation of the percept. To perceive one red ball, both its round form and its red colour, two mental objects to begin with, must be perceived fused as a sole whole indivisible object. The respective information of its parts, round form and red colour, is necessarily coded in two different neural networks of the brain. The code for round form must be different to the code for red colour, because those two codes specifically mean different things. When the percept is assembled both codes must keep their respective heterogeneity, their respective meaning, for the “red ball” percept to be effective as such, they must keep on being two different sets of neurons with different patterns of discharge, even though their discharging activity somehow fuses as a function of time to become some particular whole by some sort of synchronization of the correlative neural activity of both sets of neurons that doesn’t consist in a synchronization of their frequencies. If the neurons that code form and colour were to synchronize their frequencies to build up the percept, the discharge pattern of the train of action potentials coding round form in one given neural network would be identical to the pattern coding red colour in another network, in which case the heterogeneity between form and colour would disappear and the perception of a red ball would not be possible, and it is possible.

To try and solve this binding problem, the phase synchronization hypothesis was proposed (Fontoira, 2010). According to this hypothesis the transient phase synchronization (instead of the synchronization of the frequencies) between single neuronal signals from different but compatible neural networks in the association cortex, during the process of perception, might be the neural mechanism behind this fusion of mental objects to give rise to the percept.

This hypothesis is provable and refutable, because the technique to detect single signals, the action potentials of one single neuron, has been available for years now (for instance: Weinberger et al., 2012).

Phase synchronization between complex signals in the brain has been described previously (Varela, 2001), but complex signals are obtained from too big neural arrays, insufficiently defined so, although they reflect the oscillatory character of the neural activity, as usual with any electroencephalographic recording, that doesn’t permit the identification of mental objects, or their binding to give rise to a percept.

The recording of specific single signals with microelectrodes, the action potentials of single neurons, will probably be necessary in years to come to prove this hypothetical explanation of consciousness.

3. The possibly emergent character of consciousness.

Consciousnesss possibly has an emergent character, because neurons are thousands and are connected in a discontinuous manner, while each conscious individual person feels unique and indivisible at first sight.

Form and colour fuse in the percept in the abstract grounds, forming an emergent unique and individual mental object, a sole and at first sight indivisible mental image of a red ball as a whole, in which the whole will be more (unique and indivisible) than the sum of its parts, due to the fact of the brain being a non linear system.

If the brain were a linear system, ruled by de principle of superposition, round form and red colour would sum up as two objects, one object round and colourless and the other one red and formless, not a unique and individual mental object, the “red ball” percept.

As the action potentials are real, in other words, detectable, they take place and they are not virtual, then the information they form takes effect evidently too, but with an emergent coded meaning, with the illusory (but fortunate, given the fact that snooker can be played) form they apparently have at first sight to the naked eye on a macroscopic scale, due to the loss of resolution with the change of scale during the process of perception, whence the information becomes integrated, as the multiple microscopic individual parts become sets of blurred but meaningful macroscopic wholes, including the qualitative character sensations are perceived with. This is analogous to what happens with the pixels on a computer screen for a macroscopic conscious observer at first sight with the naked eye, for the pixels will be perceived, for instance if that’s the case, as the emergent image of a red ball on the screen at first sight to the naked eye on that particular macroscopic scale, although they will remain multiple microscopic pixels on the correspondent microscopic scale, coloured light dots, representing that emerging on a macroscopic scale image by way of the configuration they adopt on the microscopic scale.

In a physical system two objects can be detected as one if the process of observation is performed with scaling, which refers to the change in the magnitude that is obtained as the result of a measurement when the scale of measurement is changed. It also includes the change in the resolution with which the measurement is performed and therefore the change in the way things are perceived depending on the scale employed. For instance: on a computer screen, on a microscopic scale, with a powerful magnifier glass, the pixels will be perceived by the viewer who is using the magnifier as pixels; on the other hand on a macroscopic scale, at first sight with the naked eye, after removing the magnifier, the pixels will be seen but they won’t be perceived as pixels because of the change of scale and the consequent loss of spatial resolution after the removal of the magnifier. The pixels are too small to be perceived individually to the naked eye. Whatever is perceived on the screen on a macroscopic scale in the place of the pixels will be a function of the information configurated by those same pixels on a microscopic scale though, by their particular interaction, in this case by the particular way they are placed against each other in a concrete organized pattern along the spatial coordinates on the screen. Thus, the pixels might shape, for instance, an image representing on a large scale a red snooker ball, indiscernible as such on a microscopic scale, but emergent as an illusory red ball on a macroscopic scale in the conscious observer’s mind.

Although pixels are only perceived on a microscopic scale and a red ball only on a macroscopic scale on that screen, in both cases there’d be only pixels on that screen. The emergent red ball to the eye of the macroscopic observer would be an illusion in any case. The image of a red ball on the computer screen would be real, would take effect on the large scale, it would be detectable and discernible as such red ball at first sight to the naked eye, but it would be a false ball, real but untrue, unable to be picked up from the screen to play snooker with.

The change of scale and the scaling help explain how emergent properties and objects can be observed in a system whose state of things is changing. Specific objects and properties seem to emerge on a macroscopic scale within that system when a particular change of the state of things takes place before an observer (a change in the positions of the pixels on a system of pixels, for instance), when a peculiar interaction of the elements of the system (the pixels) takes place on a fundamental microscopic scale (the observer is a system too). That interaction results in a rise in the amount of information of the system, which becomes detectable, on a macroscopic scale, in the form of emergent objects and properties, like a red ball on a screen, or the humidity of the water, or the sweetness of sugar. The word “emergence” means, in these cases, a dynamic change in the form of the matter of a system (an increase in the amount of information), but according to the way that information is perceived on a scale which is relatively macroscopic respect of the scale on which the interaction of the elements of the system takes place, and after a change of scale and the correspondent loss of resolution (spatial resolution, temporal resolution or both). For instance: when the pixels get sufficiently organized on the screen on a microscopic scale, at some point a large image of a red ball (for instance) seems to take sufficient form on a large scale, seems to gain apparently enough spatial resolution and definition of the large image, so that it starts to “emerge” with some meaning at first sight to the naked eye on a macroscopic scale according to the perceiving macroscopic conscious observer.

Then if consciousness were an emergent phenomenom of the brain, the process of perception should be taking place with scaling, on a relatively macroscopic scale and with a loss of resolution.

4. Neuronal synchronization.

Any system of coupled oscillators, interconnected and with characteristic frequencies, such as the neurons, spontaneously self organizes and the result is a synchronization (Strogatz, 1989).

Self organization and periodicity resulting in synchronization are possible for the brain, being a neguentropic and open system (as explained somewhere else in this blog).

Neuronal synchronization is considered a mechanism of neuronal integration, because it allows the explanation of the funciontal connection between neural sets (Lopes Da Silva, 2013).

A wave is a disturbance transmitted in a medium or in the vacuum. A wave motion consists in the transmission of a simple harmonic vibratory motion, a periodic oscillation around a point zero, with variable speed which is proportional to the distance to the point. It can be graphically represented with an undulated line, with time in abscissa, to visualize the period and the frequence of the wave. A spike is the highest point of the line representing each undulation. A phase is a given point along the line representing the undulation. The distance between successive phases of a wave is known as phase difference. If the wave is regular the phase difference will be a constant. Given two waves there will be a phase difference between them too.

When two waves coincide by all of their phases, for instance, all of their spikes, it can be considered that a synchronization of their frequencies has taken place. For this to happen both waves must have the same frequency. If the two waves synchronize their frequencies the phase difference between them will be constant. A constant phase difference between two waves will suppose a coupling of the oscillations of both as a function of time, a synchronization, their spikes will coincide on the same points along the timeline. The same thing will occur with coupled oscillators such as neurons for, although neurons are not waves, their discharges show periodicity and frequence, therefore they can synchronize their frequencies, for instance, by the coincidence of the spikes of their action potentials, with more or less accuracy, and so a constant phase difference can be set up between them too.

When a phase difference between two given neural signals (single or complex) is constant, and both have the same frequency, then their frequencies will be synchronized, their discharges will be homogeneous, and that has something to do with the way the signal propagates along the neural networks (Lopes Da Silva, 2013), such as is the case of the synchronization after a neurogenic stimulus of the muscle fibers involved in a synergic muscular contraction.

Inhomogeneity is necessary to be conscious though, therefore the synchronization of frequencies, for instance, the synchronization of the neurons coding form and colour by their frequencies, as it would result in the homogeneity of their patterns of discharge and hence their codes, the information pertaining form and colour, the synchronization of frequencies cannot be the explanation of a percept such as “red ball”, because in that case the respective heterogeneity of form and colour would disappear and the perception of a red ball would not be possible, and it is possible. Several investigations on vision (Zeki and Bartels, 1998) permitted the corroboration that in fact to be conscious it’s mandatory to be conscious of something. At the same time those investigations allowed to obtain evidence about the direct link between the neural areas coding movement (not form in that case) and colour when explaining perception, although without unveiling the fundamental mechanism, which will possibly require the key detection of the foretold phase syncronization between single neuronal signals.

There is possibly no consciousness without a mind, without the computation of heterogeneous abstract information. Consciousness would be the heterogeneous and abstract mental information of a peculiar systematic neuronal interaction with the emergent property of the also abstract uniqueness and individuality of that information (and so round and red would get the form of a unique an indivisible red roundness, the “red ball” percept and that uniqueness and indivisibility would be consciousness, and consequently consciousness probably emerges by a change in the scale of perception when the percept is being formed).

Given two waves, let’s suppose that one of them has a regular frequence of 2 Hz and of 3 Hz the other one. If they maintain a different frequence each, they will not be able to synchronize their frequencies, they won’t be able to coincide by all of their spikes. For that to happen they should keep the same frequency, both oscillating at 2 Hz or both at 3 Hz. If the first wave keeps a frequence of 2 Hz and the second one a frequence of 3 Hz, they can get synchonized in another way though, in order to keep a constant phase difference, specifically like this: both waves can coincide in one point along abscissa by one phase of each wave every certain constant number of oscillations for each wave. In this example, both waves will coincide by the same phase every two oscillations of the first wave and every three oscillations of the second wave, and so, through this other mechanism, a constant phase difference can be established too. This is another way to get synchronized without synchronizing the frequencies.

There are two ways to synchronize two waves then, two ways to establish a constant phase difference between them: first, by a synchronization of the frequencies, when both waves share the same frequency, which gives rise to a constant phase difference between, for instance, all of the spikes of both waves, and, second, by a synchronization of their phases, when both waves don’t share the same frequency, which gives rise to a constant phase difference between, for instance, concrete (for each wave) repetitive sequences of spikes of both waves (instead of getting mutually geared by all of their spikes they get geared by specific sequences of both of them).

For a phase synchronization to take place, the emission of both waves must be coherent, meaning with the coincidence of one specific first phase of each wave at the same point in time (of abscissa), thus staying coupled both waves as a function of time from then on, for a constant phase difference will be established from that point on, regardless of their particular frequencies (unlike what happened in the case of the synchronization of frequencies, where sharing the same frequency was mandatory).

The coherent discharge of action potentials between neurons of different parallel networks is possible too, and networks can be made compatible like this (mutually coherent), so that their phase synchronization of their single signals can take place. Neurons can act as pacemakers, just like other excitable cells of the body with the capacity to get discharged, and that coherence between compatible networks might be already taking place in the brain thanks to the talamocortical pacemaker and the rest of known feedback mechanisms, according to the classical descriptions by Bishop, later on by Llinás (also regarding the talamocortical pacemaker) and more recently by Edelman and Tononi (the latter named the corticocortical loop feedback activity “reentry”) and some other investigators (Uhlhaas, 2008).

5. Making up neural networks during perception.

One neuron, for instance, a neuron A in the association cortex which belonged to a neural network transmitting coded information with the conceptual meaning of round form, might be a part of more than one network in different moments (a classical idea about the brain), but, taking this a step forward, neuron A hypothetically might also be a part of more than one network at the same time. This groundbreaking idea might make sense like this: during the perception of a red ball, A might belong simultaneously to the network “round form” and to the supernetwork “red ball”. Let’s see how this might be possible:

One neuron A of the “form” network would be transmitting a train, or sequence, of action potentials, with a specific pattern of discharge, to a second neuron A’ of the same “form” network. This AA’ message would be transmitting coded information meaning “(round) form” or the “form” code.

At the same time, and through an AB interaction, an AB synchronization would be taking place by means of a phase synchronization between neuron A of the “(round) form” network and neuron B of the “(red) colour” network: an action potential of the “form” code, during a transmission AA’ in the “form” network, would be in a phase synchronization with a coherent action potential of the “colour” code during a parallel (and simultaneous with AA’) BB’ transmission in the compatible (with AA’ or mutually coherent) “colour” network.

The coherent action potential of A that would establish a phase synchronization with the correspondent discharge of B would be a part of the sequence of action potentials of the “form” code during the AA’ transmission, and the same with B.

As the AB phase synchronization and the AA’ transmissión and the BB’ transmission would take effect at the same time (although on different time scales, for the AB phase synchronization wouldn’t be already detectable when the AA’ and BB’ transmissions were completed and therefore became detectable), the AB phase synchronization would trigger the synchronization of the AA’ and BB’ sequences through the establishment of a constant phase difference between AA’ and BB’, but without a synchronization between the respective frequencies of the AA’ and BB’ trains, so although AA’ woud remain coherent in respect of BB’ they would also remain heterogeneous to each other, and that’s just what was needed to build up a percept like “red ball”, coherence and synchronization of its parts but with heterogeneity. AA’ and BB’ would be mutually coherent through this hypothetical neural mechanism, and the codes “form” and “colour” would get synchronized like this, by specific sequences of discharge (sets of consecutive spikes), not by their frequencies (not by each and every spike), and so the “form” code would be able to keep its heterogeneity in respect of the “colour” code, for the key to the formation of the percept “red ball” and the perception of a red ball (or anything at all) to be possible.

This is how neuron A would become a part of the “red ball” super network, how it would become integrated in the super-network by means of an AB and an AA’-BB’ synchronization of this manner, but still being a part of the “form” network at the same time, through the AA’ transmission.

Once again: so that the “form” and “colour” codes can be coherent to one another, the discharges of A and B have to be compatible, mutually coherent as well, meaning verifiable at the same time. That coherence would probably be possible through the talamocortical feedback pacemaker and the other following corticocortical feedback (reentry) circuits correspondingly involved.

The detection of phase synchronization between single signals in association cortex between compatible networks would probably mean the demonstration of a new mechanism of neuronal integration too, a mechanism involved in the formation of super-networks such as the one making up the “red ball” percept, for instance.

6. Making up the percept.

The AA’ transmission of the “form” code would establish a minimum amount of time necessary for the “(red) form” code to verify: the time needed for a complete AA’ transmission to be detectable as such on the correspondent scale. That minimum time would be a unit of time on a scale on which the “form” code would be detectable, for instance, as a part of the percept “red ball” by means of an interaction like AA’-BB’, by the synchronization of AA’ and BB’ through the establishment of a constant phase difference between them.

A physical phenomenon, a change of the state of a system, with the subsequent increase of information, takes effect and is detectable when interactions between its elements (for instance, between AA’ and BB’ by their synchronization) take place (it’s the same case in the field of abstract matters in the brain, as it happens, for instance, when the interaction between letters gives rise to words, words to phrases, and so on). In the case of the phenomenon of the perception of a red ball, its taking place and being detectable would rely on the interactions between “form” and “colour” at some point (of abscissa) along the process to become the percept “red ball”, interactions of the type AB, AA’, BB’ and AA’-BB’. The AB interaction would be the AB synchronization through phase synchronization. The AA’ interaction would be the transmission of coded information meaning “form”, making up the “form” network. The BB’ interaction would be transmission of the “colour” message, the “colour” network. The AA’-BB’ interaction would be the establishment of a constant phase difference between the corresponding compatible networks configuring the “form” and “colour” codes on the association cortex, the AA’-BB’ synchronization.

For the AB phase synchronization to verify and be detectable as such only an action potential of A and another one of B would be required, and with a minimum of time to verify too, a reference unit of the time scale on which the verification of that phase synchronization would be detectable. That time unit would be lesser than the minimum time necessary to verify the completion of the transmission of the AA’ and BB’ messages, because AA’ (and BB’) would need more than one action potential to verify (because they consist of a sequence of action potentials), or else the AA’ code wouldn’t become distinct in respect of the BB’ code, and then the red ball wouldn’t be perceived, not one individual would be conscious of it and there’d be no consciousness to be explained.

Thus, the verification of an AA’-BB’ synchronization in the form of a constant phase difference between AA’ and BB’ will probably require a complete AA’ and BB’ transmission (a train of several consecutive action potentials from A and B), therefore it will probably take place in a different and bigger time scale (relatively macroscopic) than the verification of an AB synchronization through an AB phase synchronization (one action potential each neuron, a significantly briefer phenomenon in comparison).

Now, if a reference unit is bigger than the magnitude of the change of state in a system according to a given parameter, the magnitude will be undetectable as such on the scale of that unit. For example: It can’t be measured, utilizing a termometer divided in degrees (a resolution of one degree at a time then), a rise of temperature of a thousand of a degree. Such magnitude of a change (0.001 degrees) will be undetectable using whole degrees as its value, in that relatively macroscopic scale of the degrees, even though its whole value of a thousand of a degree can be detectable using another scale divided in thousands of a degree, which would be relatively microscopic in respect of the scale of degrees. Even though an observer without sufficient capacity of resolution, a resolution in a scale of the thousands of a degree at least, wouldn’t notice that rise of temperature, that uselessness of the scale in degrees in this example wouldn’t stop the rise of temperature of one thousand of a degree from occurring, because the properties of a system won’t disappear with a change of scale (Gehm and Thomas, 2005).

Thus, when a microscopic change of the state of the system can also be somehow detected on a macroscopic scale, such as in the example of those pixels on a computer screen that can be detected too at first sight with the naked eye, only not as pixels but, for instance, as a red ball, that microscopic change will be eventually detected, but due to the loss of resolution at the effective macroscopic scale, in the form of emergent objects, properties, or both, not as the now apparently undetectable at first sight to the naked eye pixels, for instance, but as a red ball.

If the reference unit, the time lapse needed to verify the completion of the AA’ and BB’ transmissions, were bigger than the magnitude to be detected, the time lapse needed so that the verification of the AB phase synchronization could take place utterly, namely the magnitude of the transient change of the electric charge of the neuronal membrane, the action potential of A implied in the configuration of the information meaning an AB synchronization by means of an AB phase synchronization, then even though the magnitude would be a part of the train of action potentials of the AA’ transmission of the “form” code, it would be undetectable as such magnitude in its own value, as an AB phase synchronization, as a part of the coded information meaning “red ball” on the time scale in which the “form” and “colour” codes were to be detectable as such within the completion of the transmission of the AA’ and BB’ messages and their interaction through an AA’-BB’ constant phase difference (their synchronization as a matter of fact, the synchronization of “form” and “colour”, their becoming a unique and indivisible whole on a larger scale). The action potentials involved in the AB phase synchronization would be terminated and would have disappeared by the time the AA’ and BB’ transmissions became completed, that’s why they would be undetectable by then in any possible way and therefore also undetectable the configuration of information meaning AB phase synchronization on the relatively macroscopic scale on which the detectability of the configuration of information meaning synchronization of “form” and “colour” would verify. That’s how the individual pixels (the phase synchronization between single signals, the phase synchronization between the single action potentials of neurons A and B involved) would get blurred and out of sight in the brain at first sight to the naked eye with this change of scale, this scaling, that’s how the magnifying glass would get removed and the change of scale would take place in order for the emergence of the red ball (the AA’-BB’ synchronization) at first sight (on a larger scale, with the consequent loss of resolution) to happen. That’s how the percept would get its emergent character.

The AB synchronization, however the loss of time resolution with the change of scale, would remain detectable on the macroscopic scale, but not in the form of pixels now, an AB phase synchronization (the single A and B action potentials involved in the AB phase synchronization) but in the emergent form, on the bigger scale, of an AA’-BB’ constant phase difference, a synchronization of “form” and “colour”, in other words, as the uniqueness of “red ball” and as its individuality, meaning its indivisibility into two percepts as a function of time from then on.

If the AB synchronization in the form of an emerging AA’-BB’ constant phase difference were to be detectable on a time scale bigger than the scale on which the AB synchronization were to be detected in the form of an AB phase synchronization, then the same phenomenon, the AB synchronization, would get to be detectable in the same physical substract (the same set of neurons, A and B) in two different scales (the lesser scale determined by the AB interaction and the larger determined by the AA’, BB’ and AA’-BB’ interactions, but the same A and B all the way). That determination of two scales and therefore a change of scale on a same AB neuronal set by those interactions would be possible in the brain thanks to the fact that A (and B) would belong to two different neural networks at the same time: A to AA’ and AA’-BB’ (and B to BB’ and AA’-BB’), and also due to the fact that the AA’-BB’ synchronization would take effect without the synchronization of the frequencies of A and B being necessary, otherwise the change of scale wouldn’t be possible and this change of scale is required if the process is to take place with scaling and an emergent character; that’s hypothetically how the change of scale of the AB synchronization phenomenon would be able to take place in the brain.

This is how a change of scale would be taking place in the brain and also with an abstract meaning and resulting in the formation of a real (althoug illusory) percept along the process of perception in this stage of the AB synchronization involved with the formation of the percept. This is how the verification of the AB synchronization would take effect with scaling.

This is also how a scale on which the AB synchronization phenomenon would be detectable would become relatively macroscopic in respect of the other, in other words: this is how the scale in which the AB synchronization would take place through the establishment of a constant phase difference between AA’-BB’ would become macroscopic in respect of the scale in which the AB synchronization through the establishment of an AB phase synchronization would take effect and would be detectable as such too (although on a lesser scale).

A change of scale during the observation of a phenomenon results in a loss of resolution and so it results in an emergent character of the information (the observer at first sight with the naked eye won’t perceive microscopic pixels at this point but a macroscopic red ball). This change of scale during the process of perception would grant its emergent character to perception in this particular stage of the process, to the information being processed and configurated in this manner, to its objective meaning at large scale with the loss of resolution (the percept), and to its emerging properties (uniqueness and individuality). As a matter of fact the AB synchronization wouldn’t emerge on a macroscopic scale in the form of a phase synchronization, undetectable in that form on the macroscopic scale determined by the AA’-BB’ interaction (just like pixels can’t be perceived at first sight to the naked eye), but in the shape of the emergent property of the uniqueness and indivisibility of the “red ball” mental object, after “form” and “colour” get synchronized by this other mechanism of AB synchronization (namely the synchronization of AA’ and BB’ by the establishment of a constant phase difference between them), due to the lack of resolution on the macroscopic scale for the AB synchronization to be detected as what it is like in the microscopic scale, a phase synchronization. Hence the emergent character of the mental object “red ball” and its detectability as a percept now.

Something analogous happened to the pixels on the computer screen: on a microscopic scale, pixels, and on a macroscopic scale, an emergent red ball to a macroscopic observer at first sight to the naked eye, due to the loss of resolution with the change of scale after removing the magnifying lens and going to the naked eye, which illusorily prevents the perception at first sight of the microscopic pixels as such pixels, in spite of being pixels all the way, or, in the case of the percept, would prevent the perception at first sight of the AB synchronization by means of a constant phase difference between AA’-BB’ as an AB synchronization by means of an AB phase synchronization, although that’s what it probably is. The perception of things, the interpretation of what falls into sight, is real and yet illusory (real but uncertain, imprecise: you perceive a red ball where you see pixels, illusorily blurred through the change of scale and loss of resolution, but fundamentally pixels in the end, in fact the red ball on the screen can’t be used to play snooker).

As said, a neuron A belonging to two networks at the same time by means of a phase synchronization instead of a synchronization of frequencies would make possible that the heterogeneity of the AA’ transmission towards the BB’ transmission would remain as well.

The emergent property in this case would be the illusory uniqueness and indivisibility (individuality) of the “red ball” percept as a function of time, due to the lack of temporal resolution on the bigger scale, the macroscopic scale, so that “form” and “colour” might not take effect separately as two percepts instead of one, thanks to the fact that the fundamental mechanism of their synchronization, the AB phase synchronization, would be undetectable as such, as a pixel, on the macroscopic scale, because, once again, the action potential of A (and B) involved in the establishment of the AB phase synchronization, the first action potential of the AA’ train (and the BB’ train of course) would be already undetectable when the establishment of the AA’-BB’ constant phase difference were to be detectable (when all the action potentials of the AA’ and BB’ trains finished their discharge).

7. The macroscopic character of perception

The perception of the things around us wouldn’t be macroscopic because the macroscopic objects are perceived as such (as non microscopic). The spatial size of the macroscopic objects, as it is perceived at first sight, is a relative estimation, carried out in the abstract area when a comparison between objects takes place and also when a comparison between each object’s corresponding data, memorized during the previous years of learning by trial and error, takes place.

Therefore, perception would not be macroscopic because of the spatial size of the macroscopic things that are being perceived, like cars, dogs, or red balls, but as a function of time, meaning that it would rely on the inability, due to a lack of temporal resolution, for instance, during the perception of a red ball, to differentiate “form” and “colour” as two separate percepts, at first sight to the naked eye during the perception of a red ball, on the relatively macroscopic scale on which the AB synchronization would verify in the form of an AA’-BB’ constant phase difference.

The fusion of “form” and “colour” would take effect in a patent manner with the coincidence of both codes on the same point of the macroscopic scale, but not on the same point in space (in fact, the neurons involved in the coding of form and colour originally belong to different networks, AA’ and BB’), like two indiscriminable pixels on a computer screen would to the macroscopic observer as a function of space. On the contrary, both codes would coincide, but on the same point in time, that point of abscissa on the macroscopic scale of the AA’-BB’ interaction, that instantaneous and fleeting now where perceptible reality illusorily seems to be taking place before the human macroscopic conscious observer. The scaling as a function of time of the process of perception during the formation of the percept, as described, would make the emergence of the “red ball” percept, with that illusory aspect of uniqueness and indivisibility of it parts, possible and also without the loss of the respective heterogeneity of those parts possible too.

On the scale determined by the AA’-BB’ interaction, the “form” and “colour” codes would take effect at the same time due to the lack of resolution to take effect separately on that scale, since the magnitude of their apparent separation as a function of time would be zero, as they would be fundamentally synchronized through a, by then already undetectable on that large scale (as explained) phase synchronization, and that would result in the indivisibility of the percept as a whole on a large scale. The AB synchronization, once established on a microscopic scale through an AB phase synchronization, would carry on taking effect as such AB synchronization on a macroscopic scale through an AA’-BB’ constant phase difference (the AB synchronization would be perceivable on the macroscopic scale but its fundamental microscopic mechanism, the AB phase synchronization, wouldn’t be perceivable, it wouldn’t be perceivable or detectable on the large scale as such, as it happened to the pixels and the red ball on the computer screen when observed at first sight with the naked eye). Only the uniqueness and individuality of the “red ball” percept would emerge on the large scale as an objective part of the percept during the perception of a red ball, only the AB synchronization through an AA’-BB’ constant phase difference, but not the AB phase synchronization.

The AB synchronization would verify on a macroscopic scale without the loss of the respective heterogeneity between “form” and “colour” too, and therefore that’s how the codes would positively take effect with a convenient meaning, as such codes, on a macroscopic scale, during the occurrence of their interaction, and hence taking place the perception of a macroscopic red ball, what the codes mean, due to their abstract, specific, isomorphic, congruent and mnesic character, when blurred by the change of scale, instead of microscopic action potentials, and all of this with an obvious evolutive convenience, as far as, for instance, the integration of subsequent congruent physical activities and behaviours computed by the brains and performed by the species members pertaining the game of snooker and other matters of survival are concerned.

8. Consciousness.

Phase synchronization of neuronal single signals between compatible neural networks in association cortex might be the explanation to the formation of the percept during the process of perception and the explanation of the emergent property of the uniqueness and indivisibility of its parts. Consciousness might be defined as perception in the form of a unique and individual (indivisible) self. In sequences of succesive percepts, during the process of perception, they would be consistently characterized by the same uniqueness and indivisibility of their parts. Such emerging property of the uniqueness and individuality of the percepts would be persistently located in that instantaneous ongoing and fleeting now in which the illusory perceptible reality would be elapsing at first sight to the naked eye according to any macroscopic human observer. This emergent and persistent conceptual idea of uniqueness and individuality, a percept by itself in the course of perception, eventually an abstract idea of a kind by itself too, with patent objective effect as such at first sight to the naked eye, located in the instantaneous now, mental information configurated with that specific meaning during the process of the formation of the percept, would be consciousness, those illusory individuals temporarily conscious of the reality within reach of their senses.

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